Preference elicitation in matching markets via interviews:a study of offline benchmarks (extended abstract) by Rastegari, Baharak et al.
                          Rastegari, B., Goldberg, P., & Manlove, D. (2016). Preference elicitation in
matching markets via interviews: a study of offline benchmarks (extended
abstract). 1393-1394.
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the author accepted manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online
via ACM DL at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2937029.2937176. Please refer to any applicable terms of use
of the publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published
version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms
Preference Elicitation in Matching Markets via Interviews:
A Study of Offline Benchmarks
Baharak Rastegari
School of Computing Science
University of Glasgow
Glasgow, UK
baharak.rastegari@glasgow.ac.uk
Paul Goldberg
Dept.of Computer Science
University of Oxford
Oxford, UK
paul.goldberg@cs.ox.ac.uk
David Manlove
School of Computing Science
University of Glasgow
Glasgow, UK
david.manlove@glasgow.ac.uk
Abstract
In this paper we study two-sided matching markets in which the
participants do not fully know their preferences and need to go
through some costly deliberation process in order to learn their
preferences. We assume that such deliberations are carried out
via interviews, thus the problem is to find a good strategy for in-
terviews to be carried out in order to minimize their use, whilst
leading to a stable matching. One way to evaluate the perfor-
mance of an interview strategy is to compare it against a naı¨ve
algorithm that conducts all interviews. We argue however that a
more meaningful comparison would be against an optimal offline
algorithm that has access to agents’ preference orderings under
complete information. We show that, unless P=NP, no offline
algorithm can compute the optimal interview strategy in poly-
nomial time. If we are additionally aiming for a particular stable
matching, we provide restricted settings under which efficient op-
timal offline algorithms exist.
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1 Introduction
Two-sided matching markets model many practical settings, such
as corporate hiring and university admission [6, 3]. In the clas-
sical stable marriage problem participants are partitioned into
two disjoint sets, and each participant on one side of the mar-
ket wishes to be matched to a candidate from the other side of
the market and has preferences over potential matches. A match-
ing is called stable if no pair of participants would prefer to leave
their assigned partners to pair with each other. Gale and Shap-
ley’s seminal paper [1] proposed a polynomial-time algorithm for
finding a stable matching; a rich literature has developed since.
A key assumption in much of this literature is that all market
participants know their full preference orderings. However, as
markets grow large (e.g., in the hospital-resident matching market
or college admission market [1, 3]) it quickly becomes impracti-
cal for participants to assess their precise preference rankings. In-
stead, participants usually start out with some partial knowledge
about their preferences and need to perform some deliberation
in order to learn their precise preference ordering. In this paper
we assume that deliberations are carried out via interviews. In-
terviews are usually costly, therefore we wish to minimize their
usage.
Any interviewing strategy leads to refinements of the partial or-
ders contained in the original problem instance that represented
uncertainty over the true preferences. A key aim could be to carry
out sufficient interviews so as to arrive at an instance that admits
a super-stable matching µ. Informally speaking, super-stability
ensures that µ will be stable regardless of how the remaining
uncertainty is resolved. The original instance need not admit a
super-stable matching (see [2] for an example) but we are guar-
anteed that a super-stable matching is always achievable (e.g., by
conducting all possible interviews). We seek a good strategy that
conducts as few interviews as possible so as to obtain a refined
instance that admits a super-stable matching. In general any such
strategy will be an online algorithm, since the next interview to
be carried out might depend on the results of previous ones.
2 Preliminary definitions
SMP, SMTI and SMT In an instance of the Stable Marriage
problem with Partially ordered preferences (SMP), there are two
sets of agents, namely a set of men M and a set of women W .
Each agent a finds a subset of agents on the opposite side of the
market acceptable – we refer to these as a’s acceptable candi-
dates. An agent a’s preferences over his/her acceptable candi-
dates need not be strict. That is, given two candidates, a might be
indifferent between them. We denote by I an instance of SMP,
and by pa the partial orders that represent the preference ordering
of agent a. A matching µ is a pairing of men and women such
that each man is paired with at most one woman and vice versa,
and no agent is matched to an unacceptable partner. A well stud-
ied special case of SMP is the Stable Marriage problem with Ties
and Incomplete lists (SMTI). In SMTI, each agent has a partition
of acceptable candidates into ties such that he or she is indifferent
between the candidates in the same tie but has a strict preference
ordering over the ties. The Stable Marriage problem with Ties
(SMT) is the special case of SMTI in which each man finds each
woman acceptable and vice versa.
Interviews to refine the partial orders In a given instance I of
SMP in this paper, we assume that the partial preference order-
ing profile represents the agents’ initial information state. That is,
agents may not have enough information initially in order to rank
their acceptable candidates in strict order. However each agent
a has a strict preference ordering a over his or her acceptable
candidates, although s/he may not initially be aware of this en-
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tire ordering. We let M,W denote the strict (true underlying)
preference ordering profile of all agents. The task of the agents
is to learn enough information about their acceptable candidates
in order to refine their preferences, in a manner consistent with
M,W , to obtain an SMP instance I ′ that admits a super-stable
matching µ (thus µ will be stable with respect to M,W ).
Following the model introduced in [4], we assume that in-
stances can be refined through interviews. Each interview pairs
one man m with one woman w. An interview is informative to
both parties involved. When agent a interviews ` candidates, this
results in a new refined SMP instance which is exactly the same
as I except that a now has a strict preference ordering over the `
interviewed candidates.
Note that not all refinements of I can be reached by a set of
interviews. We say that an SMP instance I ′ is an interview-
compatible refinement of I if I ′ can be refined from I using in-
terviews. We define the cost of I ′ to be the minimum number of
interviews required to refine I into I ′.
Definitions of the interview minimization problems The mo-
tivating problem is as follows: given an instance I of SMP, find
an interview-compatible refinement I ′ of minimum cost such that
I ′ admits a super-stable matching. Since the result of one in-
terview might influence which interview/s to carry out next, any
strategy for carrying out interviews should be regarded as an on-
line algorithm. Towards computing bounds for the competitive
ratio of an online algorithm, the offline scenario is of interest,
and that is what we consider in what follows. In the offline case,
the mechanism designer is given M,W , the strict (true under-
lying) preference ordering profile of the agents, and would like
to compute an optimal interviewing schedule, i.e., an interview-
compatible refinement I ′ of I , such that M,W refines I ′. This
is reflected in the definition of the following problem, named
MIN-ICR, which is an abbreviation for “Minimum-cost Inter-
view Compatible Refinement problem”.
Definition 1 An instance of MIN-ICR comprises a tuple
(I,M,W ), where I is an instance of SMP and M,W is a strict
preference ordering profile that refines I . The problem is to find
an interview-compatible refinement I ′ of I such that (i) M,W
refines I ′, (ii) I ′ admits a super-stable matching, and (iii) I ′ is
of minimum cost amongst interview-compatible refinements that
satisfy (i) and (ii).
It is sometimes the case that we aim for a particular matching,
stable under M,W , that has some desirable properties, for ex-
ample it is preferred to every other stable matching by women.
The offline problem can then be viewed as a restricted variant
of MIN-ICR where, in addition to I and M,W , we are also
equipped with a matching µ. This is reflected in the definition of
the following problem, named MIN-ICR-EXACT, which is an ab-
breviation for “Minimum-cost Interview Compatible Refinement
problem with Exact matching”.
Definition 2 An instance of MIN-ICR-EXACT comprises a tuple
(I,M,W , µ), where I is an instance of SMP, M,W is a strict
preference ordering profile that refines I , and µ is a matching that
is weakly stable w.r.t.M,W . The problem is to find an interview-
compatible refinement I ′ of I , such that (i) M,W refines I ′, (ii)
µ is super-stable in I ′, and (iii) I ′ is of minimum cost amongst
interview-compatible refinements of I that satisfy (i) and (ii).
3 Results
In the full version of this paper [5], we prove that MIN-ICR and
MIN-ICR-EXACT are NP-hard even if I is an instance of SMTI
in which each tie is of size at most 3. Further, we prove that both
problems are NP-hard even for SMT instances, and even if all
men are indifferent between all women. The hardness proofs are
by reduction from the Vertex Cover problem (VC).
We then explore the tractability of MIN-ICR-EXACT under
various restricted settings, using a reverse reduction from MIN-
ICR-EXACT to VC to prove our claims. We show that MIN-
ICR-EXACT is solvable in polynomial time under three different
restrictions: (i) if one side has fully known strict preference or-
dering, (ii) if I is an instance of SMTI in which ties are of size at
most 2, and (iii) if I is an instance of of SMTI in which all men
are endowed with the same ties, as well as all women.
4 Future work
The main direction is to investigate the online case, where the true
underlying preferences are not known to the mechanism designer,
with respect to measures such as the competitive ratio. Further-
more, an important question is whether MIN-ICR is polynomial-
time solvable under some restricted setting. Extending the known
results on interviewing in stable marriage markets to many-to-one
markets such as college admission is another important future di-
rection. It is also interesting to study online algorithms in a setting
where elicitation is taking place via comparison queries.
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